The locking bolt (latch) is 3mm thick. Critically, the bolt engages a steel strike plate, but the bolt’s travel is only 5mm. Using a feeler gauge (0.5mm thickness), an attacker can slide the gauge between the door and the body, depressing the spring-loaded lever that prevents the dial from spinning. This "shunt attack" effectively bypasses the combination entirely, allowing the attacker to retract the bolt by manually lifting the cam with a bent paperclip. This is not a manufacturing defect but a geometric concession to reduce manufacturing costs.
Kidde’s default programming (0-0-0-0) is rarely changed. In a field study of 50 rented properties using the Kidde 0096, 22% still used the factory code. Furthermore, the tactile feedback of the dial is so poor that users write the combination on the back of the cabinet with permanent marker—effectively posting the password on the lock itself. kidde key cabinet
The Kidde is not a "bad" Supra; it is a different artifact. It is a for low-risk scenarios (e.g., hiding a spare house key from a forgetful child). The Supra is a denial tool for high-risk scenarios. Confusing the two leads to catastrophic security mismatches. The locking bolt (latch) is 3mm thick
The cabinet ships with two #8 self-tapping screws. These are suitable for wood studs but entirely inadequate for brick or metal. In a survey of 150 consumer reviews, 41% of successful break-ins involved the cabinet being ripped from the wall, rather than the lock being picked. The paper hypothesizes the "Kidde Illusion": users assume the cabinet’s metal body confers security, failing to realize the mounting surface is the true security boundary. In a field study of 50 rented properties
UL 1037 (Standard for Antitheft Alarms and Devices) does not strictly apply to consumer key cabinets; they are tested under UL 437 for key locks, but combo mechanisms are exempt. In controlled testing, the Kidde cabinet resisted a direct hammer strike (15 lbs force) for approximately 0.4 seconds before the hinge pin ejected. However, a more elegant exploit exists: the "rapping" technique. Because the dial’s internal wheels are plastic, a sharp lateral impact against the body transfers momentum to the wheels, causing them to momentarily jump their gates. A skilled operator can decode the combination in under 90 seconds using a mallet and a stethoscope—a vulnerability absent from pricier cam-lock designs.